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COMMENTS
CIVIL RIGHTS-PROTECTION OF WITNESSES IN LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
INVESTIGATIONS.-On April 1, 1954, the Governor of the State of New York
signed into law the Code of Fair Procedure for Legislative and Executive
Investigations.' The Code, effective on May 1, 1954, grants to witnesses
appearing before such investigating agencies a completely new set of rights
and privileges. It amends two existing sections of the Legislative Law2 by
prohibiting "one-man" legislative hearings and adds a new section to the
Civil Rights Law3 defining the rights of witnesses at investigation hearings.
As the Governor pointed out when he signed the bill, the Code is "the first
of its kind in the nation...-4
Essential to successful and effective legislation and administration is
the collection of fact and opinion concerning the need for legislation and
the effectiveness of existing legislation.5 Such inquiries cannot be conducted
effectively by the entire legislature. Therefore, the function of hearing and
inquiry in state and federal legislatures has been delegated to standing and
select committees. The right to conduct such inquiries is well established,
even though not based on explicit constitutional power. 6 In most congres-
sional committees and a few of the states, this function is exercised with a
procedure and decorum comparable to that of the best courts. In most
states, however, the procedure is at best informal. Recently, there has
been considerable interest shown in the conduct of such hearings and in-
vestigations. While much of the controversy has revolved around the revo-
cation of the privilege against self-incrimination, 7 the reexamination has
1 L. 1954, cc. 414-416; See Governor's Message on approval of L. 1954, cc. 414-416,
April 1, 1954, N. Y. L. 1954 (McKinney) p. 1392.
2 Legislative Law §§ 60, 61.
3 Civil Rights Law § 73.
4 Supra, note 1.
5 In general, see, Nebbia v. People of the State of Nev York, 291 U. S. 502, 54
S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1933); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 47 S. Ct.
319, 71 L. Ed. 580 (1926); Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489 (1931);
Note: Legislation-Legislative Inquiries-Validity of Subpoena Issued by Senate Com-
mittee for all Telegraphic Correspondence Over Named Period, 36 Col. L. Rev. 841
(1936).
6 See McGreary, Congressional Investigations: Historical Development, 18 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 425 (1951), Hamilton, The Inquisitorial Power of Congress, 23 A. B. A. J.
511 (1937); Coudert, Congressional Inquisition v. Individual Liberty, 15 Va. L. Rev.
537 (1929); Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of In-
vestigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153 (1926); Note: 24 Tulane L. Rev. 237 (1949).
7 "No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.. ." (Emphasis supplied). U. S. CoNsT., Amend. V. United States v. Jaffe,
98 F. Supp. 191 (D. C. D. C. 1951). See Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1930); Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 31 (1949). Several state courts have
held that the state self-incrimination privilege applies to legislative investigations. Ex
parte Johnson, 187 S. C. 1, 196 S. E. 164 (1938); Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N. Y. 244,
177 N. E. 489 (1931); Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871). For a general discussion
of the self-incrimination privilege and its limitations, see 8 Wigmore, EVIDENCE, § 2250
et seq. (3d ed., 1940).
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actually been much broader.8
The new section of the New York Civil Rights Law, which for the first
time defines in statutory form the rights of witnesses appearing before in-
vestigating agencies, is much more extensive than the amendments to the
Legislative Law. The amendment to the Civil Rights Law applies not only
to hearings before legislative committees, but also to those held by the com-
missioner of investigations, or the attorney general, or by any temporary
state commission or its subcommittee having the power to require testimony
or the production of evidence.9
The amendment to the Civil Rights Law is set forth in the new Sec-
tion 73. Six of these subdivisions deal with specific rights and privileges of
persons who may be called as witnesses in legislative or executive investi-
gations:
1. No person can be required to appear at such hearings unless he is
first served with a copy of the section, i.e., Section 73, as well as a general
statement of the subject under investigation. In addition, the witness must
be furnished, if he so requests, with a copy of the order, or resolution, or
other provision of law authorizing the investigation.
10
2. The witness has the right to be accompanied by counsel who will
be permitted to advise the witness of his rights during the hearing. The
counsel may submit questions to the investigating body for the witness to
answer. However, the agency is not required to ask these questions, and
may decline to do so at its own discretion."'
3. A record of the proceedings must be prepared for every public
hearing, and the witness is entitled to obtain a copy of this record at his
own expense. If a record is kept of a private hearing, it will be similarly
made available to the witness at his own expense, if he is summoned to any
subsequent hearing, or if it develops that the record would be relevant to
any subsequent criminal proceedings in which the witness may be a de-
fendant.
12
4. The witness has the right to file with the agency a relevant sworn
statement, which will be incorporated in the record of the hearing, whether
public or private. There is no indication in this subdivision of any stand-
ard of relevancy other than the agency's own.' 3
5. If a person is named or identified at a public hearing, and be-
lieves that he has been defamed, or that the testimony at the hearing may
have an adverse effect on his reputation, he may, appear personally and
testify under oath, or he may file a sworn statement for incorporation in the
8 See, e.g. Standards for Congressional Investigations, 3 The Record 97 (Assoc.
Bar City of N. Y., March, 1948).
9 L. 1954, cc. 414 and 415; Civil Rights Law § 73, subd. 1.
1o Id. subd. 2.
11 Id. subd. 3.
12 Id. subd. 4.
13 Id. subd. 5.
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record. It is discretionary with the agency, however, as to which of these
courses the person affected will be allowed to take.
14
6. These express rights and privileges do not limit the agency's au-
thority to grant a witness further rights and privileges, in its discretion.1
Apart from the rights extended to the individual, his interests are fur-
ther protected by procedural limitations placed by Section 73 upon the in-
vestigating agency:
1. No testimony which is adduced at a private hearing conducted by a
single person may be made public without the approval of the agency head,
nor may any testimony adduced at a legislative or other multi-member
hearing, held in private, be made public without majority approval, unless
such disclosure is made in the course of a subsequent public hearing. Any
person violating this subdivision shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 10
2. No temporary state commission having more than two members
shall have power to take testimony at a public or private hearing unless at
least two members are present.17 This subdivision imposes on temporary
state commissions the same restriction imposed on the legislative committees
by the amendment of Sections 60 and 61 of the Legislative Law, discussed
infra.
3. The minority members of an investigating agency may, if they wish,
file their views with the majority opinion. If the majority subsequently
votes to make public testimony adduced at a private hearing, the minority
may prepare and make public their separate report.' 8
Sections 60 and 61 of the legislative law are the sections which empower
legislative committees and subcommittees to require the attendance of wit-
nesses by legal process. The amendments to these sections consist of the
addition of this provision: "No testimony may be taken at any legislative
present."'9 (Emphasis added.) As pointed out supra, these amendments place
upon legislative committees and subcommittees the same restriction placed
by subdivision 9 of Section 73 of the Civil Rights Law on temporary state
commissions having more than two members.
Prior to 1952, there was no statutory expression of the rights which a
witness had when testifying before an executive or legislative investigating
agency in either the Civil Rights Law or the Legislative Law.2 0  In 1952,
the legislature enacted Section 52 of the Civil Rights Law,21 which prohibits
anyone from televising, broadcasting or taking motion pictures (or arrang-
ing for such televising, broadcasting, or filming) of any proceedings within
the state "in which the testimony of witnesses by subpoena or other com-
14 Id. subd. 6.
15 Id. subd. 7.
16 Id. subd. 8.
17 Id. subd. 9.
18 Id. subd. 10.
19 L. 1954, c. 416, amending Legislative Law §§ 60, 61.
20 Civil Rights Law, Legislative Law.
21 L. 1952, c. 241.
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pulsory process is or may be taken by a court, commission, committee, ad-
ministrative agency, or other tribunal in this state." Section 52 was thus
the first statutory expression in the Civil Rights Law of a right which wit-
nesses in judicial proceedings had traditionally enjoyed, and the expression
of this right extended to investigative as well as judicial proceedings.
In the 1953 session of the legislature, a bill was passed by both houses
which would have set up a code similar to the one enacted in 1954.22 This
bill was vetoed by Governor Dewey, whose veto was accompanied by a
memorandum expressing his reasons for disapproval.2 3 The bill would have
given any person the right to be heard before the investigating body, when-
ever he "has reason to believe that he is being investigated," or if he was
"otherwise mentioned as being accused or suspected of wrongdoing." Under
the bill, the investigating agency would be permitted to examine or cross-
examine the witness under oath only if he voluntarily filed a waiver of
immunity.
Dissatisfaction with this bill was also expressed by the Committee
on State Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, whose views were quoted by the Governor in his veto message:
24
"The sweeping language of the bill appears likely to do more harm and
create more problems than the evils it appears intended to remedy.... Un-
der its provisions, a person could exercise the right to be heard, presumably
not under oath, and make any sort of self-serving declaration he wished.
Not even limitations of relevancy are placed on the type of statement to be
offered, so that it could be a political or propaganda speech. The right to
appear and make such a statement or speech would exist as an absolute
right even if in actual fact the person had not been mentioned or investigated
at all (but had only believed he had)."
Having vetoed this particular piece of legislation for the reasons above
expressed, the Governor in his 1954 Annual Message recognized the prob-
lems which that bill had sought to deal with: "Few of us question the great
public value of the public exposure of rascality and subversion. Yet many
earnest citizens are concerned lest accused witnesses be denied the right
of reply and other protections of the individual against his own government.
. . . Accordingly, I recommend the enactment of legislation to establish a
code of fair procedure in our Civil Rights Law governing the conduct of
legislative and executive investigations . ... "25 The Code, as passed at the
1954 session, would seem to be free from those features pointed out by the
Governor and by the State Legislation Committee of the Association of the
Bar as being of doubtful merit.
The effect which the Code, so recently enacted, will have on the con-
duct of executive and legislative hearings, remains a matter for speculation
22 Assembly Int. 1064, Pr. 1083, 176th Sess. (1953).
23 Message of Disapproval, N. Y. L. 1953 (McKinney) p. 2144.
24 Id. pp. 2144-2145.
25 Annual Message, 1954, N. Y. L. 1954 (McKinney) p. 1296.
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until illuminated by judicial treatment and construction. As the Governor
remarked upon approving it, the Code "is the first of its kind in the na-
tion,"26 and consequently, at the time of its passage, there were no judicial
constructions in other jurisdictions of similar legislation.
However, as the Governor asserted in his 1954 Annual Message, "New
York may take pride in the use it has made through the years of the various
forms of investigation .... The standard has been to find facts and act
upon them without favor and without persecution." 27  Accordingly, the
Code seems to be a codified guarantee of rights presently enjoyed rather
than a remedy for existing abuses.
DISSENTING STOCKHOLDERs-RIGHT TO DEMAND PURCHASE OF SHARES-
NEW YoRIK STocKc CORPORATION LA.-It is recognized as a "fundamen-
tal feature" of the contract between the members of a corporation, that
each stockholder agrees to be bound by the vote of the majority.' The right
of the majority, however, to follow its own interest, to the possible detri-
ment of an opposed minority, is limited by the principles of equity.2
It has been the tendency of the courts to limit the rule of the majority
to matters pertaining to ordinary business administration, and to require
unanimous consent for all fundamental changes, such as dissolution, change
of purpose, and sale of assets; the number of instances calling for unanimity
has tended to increase with the expansion of corporate activity; at the same
time the requirement of a 100% agreement of stockholders has become in-
creasingly less workable. As a matter of fact, it has led to the opposite
evil, because, under the unanimity rule, a dissenting minority could effec-
tively block some of the most important business decisions.,3
The resulting dilemma has led to regulatory legislation in many states.
In some states the statutes provide only for qualified majorities, in others
they give the dissenting minority a right to withdraw against payment of
their shares, in others the right to be bought out is limited to qualified
minorities.
4
The New York Stock Corporation Law establishes formalities by which,
under stated circumstances, a dissenting stockholder has the right to be
bought out by the corporation.
26 Supra, note 1.
27 Supra, note 25.
1 Stevens, HANDBOOox oT Th LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, C. 14, § 123, p. 487
(Hornbrook Series, St. Paul, 1936).
2 For an extensive discussion of the opposed principles and their treatment in the
judiciary and in literature, see Paterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper Co., 186 Minn.
611, 244 N. W. 281 (1932).
3 See Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 Col. L. Rev. 547 (1927).
4 For a discussion of the various statutory approaches to the problem, see Levy,
Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Cornell L. Q. 420
(1930). See also, Zabriskie, Appraisal Statutes-An Analysis of Modern Trends, 38
Va. L. Rev. 915 (1952).
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The following discussion will be presented under five headings: Under
which circumstances the right exists; who is entitled to payment and. how
does he make his claim; which procedure has been established to put these
rights into effect; how the value of the shares is to be determined, and
whether the demand for payment is to be regarded as an exclusive remedy.
I
The instances in which the minority can demand payment for its shares
are enumerated in Section 21 of the New York Stock Corporation Law as
amended. The law mentions four sets of circumstances, which will be dis-
cussed in the order in which they are mentioned in the law.
A. SECTION 14 OF THE NEW YORK STOCK CORPORATION LAw.-The
first instance providing for such demand is Section 14, New York Stock
Corporation Law, which deals with the case of a corporation (other than a
moneyed corporation), which provides for, or carries out, a plan for the
issue of unissued stock to its employees, or those of a subsidiary corporation;
the rule is equally applicable to the issue of stock to a trustee on their be-
half. It is immaterial whether the payment for the stock, if any, is made in
a lump sum or in installments. The establishment of a fund derived from
surplus, in which employees purchasing or owning stock may also share, falls
under the purview of this section.
The sale of treasury stock does not concern "the issue of unissued
stock," nor does it give rise to preemptive rights. It is, therefore, not cov-
ered by the statute.
Executive officers are not employees within the meaning of this rule.5
B. SEcTIoN 20 OF THE NEw YoRK STocK CORPORATION LA.-Of
greater importance than the issue of employees' shares is Section 20, which
provides for the right of a two-thirds majority of a stock corporation (other
than a Railroad corporation) to sell and convey the property, rights, privi-
leges and franchises of the corporation, or any interest therein, or part there-
of, except where otherwise provided by law. (Franchises within the state
may only be sold to domestic corporations). Sales in the regular course of
business do not fall under the scope of the provision; even sale of an entire
store by a chainstore corporation, 6 or the necessary and beneficial sale of
foreign holdings by an oil company, was found not to fall under the statute.7
However, the sale of an entire branch, even if necessary for the purposes
of retrenchment, was held to require compliance with this section;8 the con-
tention that a corporation which attempts to remain in business is under
5 In re Taliaferro, 101 N. Y. L. J. 1159 (March 13, 1939).
6 Wattley v. National Drug Stores Corp., 122 Misc. 533, 204 N. Y. Supp. 254,
aff'd, 209 App. Div. 872, 204 N. Y. Supp. 956 (1st Dept. 1924).
7 Leventall v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 241 App. Div. 277, 271 N. Y. Supp. 493
(1st Dept. 1934).
8 Matter of Timis, 200 N. Y. 177, 93 N. E. 522 (1910); Berwin & Co., Inc. v.
Hewitt Realty Co., 199 App. Div. 453, 191 N. Y. Supp. 817 (1st Dept. 1922), aff'd 235
N. Y. 608, 139 N. E. 754 (1923).
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all circumstances, unaffected by the provisions of Section 20 of the New
York Stock Corporation Law, is probably untenable, although it appears in
the dicta of various decisions.9 A general assignment for the benefit of
creditors was held to be unaffected by the restrictions of this section10 as
were other involuntary sales.'1 And an option to another corporation, en-
titling it to the purchase of corporate property, is equivalent and subject
to the same restrictixons as the contract to sell.1
2
C. ARTICLE 4 OF THE NEw YoRK STOCK CORPORATION LAw.-Several
other instances in which the dissenting minority may insist on the purchase of
its interest, appear in Article 4 of the New York Stock Corporation Law,
which deals with changes and amendments of the corporate charter. How-
ever, not all changes and amendments falling under Article 4 entitle the
minority to the demand, but only those enumerated in Section 38(11) (a)
to (d) of the New York Stock Corporation Law, to wit:
1. The disadvantageous alteration or abolition of preferential rights.
2. Creation, alteration or abolition of rights in respect of the redemp-
tion of shares of any sinking fund for the redemption or purchase of out-
standing shares affecting the holders of such shares adversely.
3. Limitation, or denial, of preemptive rights or other changes ad-
versely affecting such preemptive rights.
4. Abolition, or limitation, of voting rights, except limitations re-
sulting from voting rights given to new shares authorized by the certificate.
The nebulous wording of the latter rule has caused a good deal of
litigation.
Reclassification of non-callable stock into stock callable at a certain
price, does not fall under the statute.13 In case of an increase, or change
in capitalization, the question to be determined is, whether the rights of
the preferred stock are adversely affected, be it as to dividends, or as to
rights in liquidation. The mere increase of outstanding stock, or even super-
imposition of a new class of stock, is immaterial. 14 As the statute attempts
to delineate the mutual spheres of influence of the majority and minority
groups 15 it is not subject to restrictive or extensive interpretation; 10 the
9 277 Park Ave. Corp. v. N. Y. C. R. R., 90 N. Y. S. 2d 214 (1949) which cites
inter alia as authority Skinner v. Smith, 134 N. Y. 240, 31 N. E. 911 (1892) and
Raymond v. Security Trust & Ins. Co., 111 App. Div. 191, 97 N. Y. Supp. 557 (1st
Dept. 1906) (decisions rendered under the 1893 Act which was not identical in scope
with the modem statute).
10 Behrens v. Clark, 131 Misc. 712, 227 N. Y. Supp. 717 (1928).
1 Application of Kokol, 275 App. Div. 1021, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 103 (1st Dept. 1949),
aff'd 300 N. Y. 695, 91 N. E. 2d 333 (1950).
12 Texas Co. v. Z. & M. Independent Oil Co., 156 F. 2d 862 (2d Cir. 1946).
'3 Breslav v. N. Y. & Queens Elec. Lt. & Power Co., 249 App. Div. 181, 291 N. Y.
Supp. 932 (2d Dept. 1936), aff'd 273 N. Y. 593, 7 N. E. 2d 708 (1937).
14 Matter of Gohn, 174 Misc. 188, 20 N. Y. S. 2d 254 (Erie Co., 1940); Matter of
Kinney, 279 N. Y. 423, 18 N. E. 2d 645 (1939).
15 As set forth, In re Eaton, 189 Misc. 303, 69 N. Y. S. 2d 846, aff'd 276 App.
Div. 7, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 867 (3d Dept. 1949).
16 See Marcus v. R. H. Macy & Co., 297 N. Y. 38, 74 N. E. 2d 228 (1947).
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courts have, therefore, refused to extend the application of the section to
the creation of a class of shares preferred over the common stock in case of
dissolution, because the rights of common stockholders in the distribution
of assets do not entail a preference. 17 The court, apparently confining its
inquiry to the applicability of Section 38(11) (a) of the New York Stock
Corporation Law, did not feel that the creation of the new class tended to
alter the common stock's right in respect of redemption.
D. MERGER VERSUS CONSOLIDATION UNDER THE STATUTE.-The most
frequent case of a minority demand for purchase of its stock is that of mer-
ger and consolidation. Merger is generally distinguished from consolidation,
by defining a "merger" as the act of combining two corporations in such a
way, that the corporate entity of one corporation survives, while the others
are absorbed; in a "consolidation," on the other hand, a new, hitherto non-
existent entity is created, while the constituent corporations are absorbed. Is
The Stock Corporation Law obscures this semantic borderline by providing,
in Section 86, that "any two or more domestic business corporations may
be consolidated into a single corporation, which may be either a new cor-
poration, or any of the constituent corporations."
The provisions concerning minority remedies in cases of Mergers and
Consolidations, are contained in Sections 85, 86, 87 and 91 of the New York
Stock Corporation Law, Section 85 dealing with mergers by which a domes-
tic corporation or a foreign corporation, authorized to do business in New
York State, absorbs a 95 per cent interowned domestic subsidiary, or by
which a domestic corporation absorbs a 95 per cent interowned foreign
corporation; (it does not provide for the merger of two foreign corporations,
authorized to do business in New York). Prerequisite for such merger is,
in all cases, that the absorbed corporation is engaged in business similar, or
incidental to, the business of the parent corporation. Section 85(1), New
York Stock Corporation Law.
Sections 86 and 87 deal with "Consolidations" (as defined above) of
two or more domestic business corporations; Section 91 deals with the con-
solidation of one or more domestic corporations, with one or more foreign
corporations. In view of the fact that any case, which satisfies the language
of Section 85, New York Stock Corporation Law, will also fall under either
Section 86, or Section 91 of the New York Stock Corporation Law, no differ-
ence can be seen between the results of the two methods, inasmuch as the
scope of this discussion is concerned. It should be noted, however, that
Section 91, New York Stock Corporation Law provides a shorter period
for the minority to claim its rights; stockholders who know the nature of
the transaction, will not be excused of their default because they believed
a transaction to be a "merger," unless the transaction actually fits into the
narrow definition of Section 85 of the New York Stock Corporation Law.19
17 Standard Brewers v. Peachey, 108 N. Y. S. 2d 583 (1951).
18 Stevens, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW Or PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, C. 14, § 123, p. 491
(Hornbook Series, St. Paul, 1936); Matter of Bergdorf, 149 App. Div. 529, 133 N. Y.
Supp. 1012 (1st Dept. 1912), aff'd 206 N. Y. 309, 99 N. E. 714 (1912).
19 Application of Gerstle-Rhein S. A., 194 Misc. 795, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 778 (1949).
.19551
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
II
Minority stockholders, in order to be entitled to a demand for pay-
ment, must fulfill the requirements of the various rules dealt with above.
A. ELIGIBILITY IN CASE OF ISSUE OF STOCK TO EMPLOYEES UNDER
SECTION 14 Or THE NEW Yoix STOCK COPORATION LA.-The first pre-
requisite for a stockholder's demand in this case, is the existence of a pre-
emptive right to subscribe to the stock in issue.
A preemptive right is the right of a stockholder to purchase newly issued
stock, in order to maintain his proportionate position in the management,
the profits and the substance of the corporation.
The rules, and certain recognized exceptions to these rules, are set forth
in Section 39 of the New York Stock Corporation Law. The exceptions, in
which new stock issued will not be subject to preemptive rights, are:
1. Stock issued to effect a merger or consolidation;
2. Stock issued to satisfy conversion or option right;
3. Stock issued for property or services;
4. Stock issued out of uncancelled treasury stock;
5. Stock issued pursuant to a plan of reorganization;
6. Stock authorized in the original certificate of incorporation, and
issued within two years from its filing.
'In addition thereto, stock originally subject to preemptive rights, but
not purchased by those entitled thereto, is free from such rights during one
year following the period of entitlement. It is obvious that most of these
exceptions are by their nature inapplicable in case of employees' shares, and
the remaining ones only in rare instances.
For the purposes of this discussion it may therefore be assumed that
in most instances of issuance of employees' shares preemptive rights will
exist. A further prerequisite for the establishment of the minority share-
holders' right is that the shareholder has not voted in favor of the plan and
has raised a timely objection and demand for payment of his stock. In case
he received notice of a meeting to vote on the plan 20 days before the meet-
ing, his objection must be raised prior to the vote; if the notice was not
mailed to him at least 20 days before the vote, he has 20 days' time after
the date of mailing to raise his objection and demand. If the stockholders'
consent is given in writing without a meeting, the objection and demand
must be made within 20 days after the mailing to the stockholder of a notice
setting forth the plan and informing him, that the consent of the stock-
holders entitled to vote has been given in writing. All objections and de-
mands must be made in writing and filed with the corporation. A pre-
ferred stockholder should be entitled to objection and demand even if he
has no right to vote; contrary findings in the case of Section 20, New York
Stock Corporation Law are probably not sufficient to support a contrary
opinion.
20
20 See comments to § 20, infra.
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B. ELIGIBILITY IN CASE OF A VOLUNTARY SALE OF PROPERTY, RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND FRANCHISES UNDER SECTION 20 OF THE NEW YoRx STOCK
CORIORATION LAw.-The formalities and periods prescribed for the objec-
tion and demand in this case, are the same as in the previous instance. How-
ever, this section requires a formal stockholders' meeting, called pursuant to
Section 45 of the New York Stock Corporation Law. The notice of the
meeting must state the factor of sale to be proposed.2 1 In a case where the
consent obtained at a directors' meeting instead of a stockholders' meeting, it
was held that the sale was voidable.
22
There is some authority to the effect that a stockholder forfeits his
right if he expressed his consent, even though no formal meeting had taken
place.23  Such findings may be based on the principles of estoppel. It is
difficult to understand, however, how the individual consent of two-thirds
of the stockholders could be declared "as effective as if they had voted at
a formal meeting." 24 If a sale is voidable (or void) due to failure to
obtain the necessary consent under observance of the proper formalities,
the dissenting minority is neither obliged, nor entitled, to demand the pur-
chase of its shares. 25 It has been held that the section is not applicable to
preferred stockholders without vote.26 This theory is based on the fact
that the law provides for the consent of two-thirds of the stockholders "en-
titled to vote thereon," and that the right to demand payment is limited to
stockholders "not voting in favor." The court, invoking the authority of
Marcus v. R. H. Macy & Co.,' goes on to say that "unequivocal language
of a statute" bars its extensive or restrictive interpretation. Actually the
wording of the Statute does not bear out the court's contention except by
inference. The words "entitled to vote," do not refer to the right to de-
mand but to the right to decide on the sale; similarly the words "stock-
holder not voting in favor," indicate only that a stockholder is estopped
from his demand, if he has voted in favor; only extensive interpretation,
which the court itself frowns upon, could treat a stockholder, not entitled
to vote, as if he had voted in favor.
The Ohio statute declares expressly that stockholders, not entitled to
vote, have to be treated like dissenters.
C. ELIGIBILITY IN CASE OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES OF STOCKHOLDERS'
RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 38 (11) (A)-(D) OF THE NEw YORK STOCK COR-
PORTATION LA.-The procedure for objection and demand and the periods
within which they must be made, are in this case the same as under Section
21 Starret Corp. v. Fifth Ave. Corp., 1 F. Supp. 868 (D. C., S. D., N. Y, 1932).
22 Matter of Drosnes, 187 App. Div. 425, 175 N. Y. Supp. 628 (1st Dept. 1919).
In the subsequent case of Matter of MacDonald, 205 App. Div. 579 (2d Dept. 1923),
the Appellate Division expressed the opinion that a sale in vio]ation of the section
was void.
23 Berkey v. Third Ave. R. 1. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. 58 (1926).
24 Texas Co. v. Z. & M. Independent Oil Co., 156 F. 2d 862 (2d Cir. 1946).
25 Matter of MacDonald, 205 App. Div. 579, 199 N. Y. Supp. 873 (2d Dept. 1923).
26 In re Application of Harwitz, 192 Misc. 91, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 570 (1948).
27 See note 13, supra.
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14 (Employees' Shares), except that, in absence of a meeting, a notice must
be filed which, not only states the nature of the action contemplated, but also
the date on which the certificate embodying the change (as required under
Section 37 (1) (B), New York Stock Corporation Law) was filed. There is
no doubt that the remedy of this section is applicable to stockholders regard-
less of voting rights.
D. ELIGIBILITY IN CASE OF MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS UNDER
SECTIONS 85, 87 AND 91 OF THE NEW YORK STOCK CORPORATION L AV.-
The procedures prescribed for Mergers and Consolidations differ slightly
from each other. In case of a "Merger" (Section 85, New York Stock
Corporation Law), the objection can only be raised by a dissenting stock-
holder owning part of the five per cent, or less, of the absorbed corporation.
The objection and demand must be made within 20 days after the filing of
the certificate with the Secretary of State. In case of "Consolidation" (Sec-
tions 86, 87, New York Stock Corporation Law), the objection and demand
must be made within the same period as prescribed for stockholders opposing
the issue of employees' shares (see II-A supra); in case of a vote without
meeting, the notice must not only set forth the plan of consolidation, but also
that the consent of the required two-thirds majority has been received. A
stockholder of a constituent corporation, which is to survive the consolida-
tion, is not entitled to the benefits of this section, unless the consolidation
affects any of the substantial changes enumerated in Section 38 (11), New
York Stock Corporation Law, in which case his objection and demand may
be based on such grounds (see II-C supra). A stockholder is not entitled
to the demand, if he bought his shares after the action from which he pur-
portedly dissents.28 He is not regarded as a bona fide dissenter. However,
the mere acceptance of payment and surrender of stock certificates was not
considered a bar to further action on the part of the stockholder. 29
III
The procedure to be followed, if a stockholder raises an objection and
demand for payment, is outlined in Section 21 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law. In such case the first step is up to the corporation, whose
agents shall make an offer of payment. The offer must be made ten days
after the last day in which the demand might have been made. It shall be
made in writing and delivered personally, or by registered mail. The mail-
ing has to be sent to the address appearing on the stockbook, or if the stock-
holder has designated another mailing address to the corporation's secre-
tary, it shall be sent to the address so designated. All offers made to ob-
jecting stockholders of the same class shall be made on the same terms
and conditions, and at the same price per share. This rule is designed to
prevent special deals with the more powerful dissenters, to the detriment
of others. The offer shall be accompanied by a balance sheet. This bal-
28 Application of Wood, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 110 (1951).




ance sheet shall not predate the offer by more than six months, but if this
is impractical the corporation may submit the latest balance sheet avail-
able, as long as it is not older than the closing date of the last fiscal year.
Simultaneous with the balance sheet, a Profit and Loss Statement for the
twelve months preceding the date of the balance sheet shall be submitted.
The law does not say whether these financial statements must be based on
the books of account, although this may be assumed; nor does it say
whether the same basis is to be used, which the corporation uses for tax, or
other purposes. There are no requirements as to certification, officers' affi-
davits, etc., and it seems that a balance sheet prepared by the corporation
itself, on any possible basis of accounting, satisfies the statute. The courts
apparently have not dealt with any of these questions, which might indi-
cate that the requirement of submitting financial statements is more or less
a formality. Of course, the amount of the corporation's offer will depend
on the amounts legally available for the purpose of the purchase.
Theoretically, the corporation could use its entire earned and capital
surplus, plus such part of its capital as represented by the shares purchased;
the law contains only the precaution that the purchase must not reduce
"the actual value of the assets" to an amount of its debts and liabilities,
plus the amount of its capital, reduced by the amount of capital used for
the repurchase of the minority stock (Section 21 (2), New York Stock
Corporation Law). The accent of this provision must be placed on the
word "actual," because the formula set forth in the first sentence of Section
21 (2) would, according to rules of accounting, never lead to a reduction of
net book value below the limit protected by the exemption. The statute
declares expressly that a purchase under this rule shall not be deemed a
dividend or distribution of capital; a distribution of capital is ordinarily
forbidden by law (Section 58, New York Stock Corporation Law), and in
most cases causes consenting directors to be liable for the deficiencies; it
may make officers and directors guilty of a misdemeanor.
30
Unless the stockholder accepts the offer, he has to submit his shares
within 20 days to the corporation which will note thereon the fact that
these shares are subject to a demand for purchase. A certificate, thus en-
dorsed, will give the transferee of such stocks the rights of the original
objecting stockholder. Failure to submit the shares will cause forfeiture
of the right to demand repurchase, unless excused by the court for good
cause. The requirement of placing a notation on the certificates may be
waived by the corporation, because the rule is deemed to exist only for the
protection of the corporation.31 The notation is unnecessary, if the stock-
holder accepts the corporation's offer. In this case, the stockholder has to
return his certificate, with his endorsement, and with transfer tax stamps
attached. The corporation may hold the shares, or dispose of them. Shares
bought out of capital shall be retired, and others may be retired by resolution
30 N. Y. Penal Law § 664.
31 Matter of Thomas, 259 App. Div. 843, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 314 (2d Dept. 1940).
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of the board of directors. A "Certificate of reduction of Capital" has to be
filed under observance of detailed formalities set forth in the law.
If the corporation fails to make a timely offer and if it does not observe
the formal requirements set forth above, the result is the same as if an effort
had been made, and rejected (Section 21 (3), New York Stock Corporation
Law). Failure to accept, within 20 days after mailing or delivery, the cor-
poration's offer, is also tantamount to a refusal of the offer. In case the
offer is not accepted, either the stockholder or the corporation may petition
the Supreme Court to determine the value of such stock. The petition shall
be made on five days' notice, returnable on the fiftieth day after the expira-
tion of the deadline for making the demand (see II supra). Several pro-
ceedings may be consolidated under Section 96, of the Civil Practice Act,
and two or more objecting stockholders may join, or be joined, under Sec-
tion 212, Civil Practice Act. The place of venue for the petition may be
at any special term of the Supreme Court, in the judicial district in which
the principal office of the corporation is situated.
The court so petitioned must first determine whether the objecting
stockholders fall under any of the categories entitled to the determination
of the value of their stock, and whether they have fulfilled the formal re-
quirements which are the prerequisites of the determination (Section 21 (4),
New York Stock Corporation Law). If the court finds the stockholder so
entitled, it may determine the value without appointing an appraiser, and
enter judgment against the corporation in favor of the objecting stock-
holder (Section 21 (4), New York Stock Corporation Law).
If the court does not choose to make the determination of value itself,
it will appoint an appraiser, in accordance with certain formalities provided
by the law. The appraiser may receive directions from the court; he is
supposed to consider all relevant legal evidence; he has the rights of a ref-
eree and may subpoena witnesses. The keeping of a stenographic transcript
of the testimony is mandatory. The value shall be determined as of the
day before the stockholders' vote, which precipitated the stockholder's objec-
tion, but shall exclude any changes in value resulting from the action ob-
jected to. In case the action was taken without a meeting, the date when
the requisite number of written consents was received will be the valuation
date; in case of a merger, the day of the filing of the certificate of owner-
ship will govern. The appraiser's report shall state the value arrived at,
and the reasons for the conclusion. It shall be submitted, with a transcript
of the testimony, and all other exhibits, within 60 days or at such later date
as the court shall direct. Copies of the report have to be mailed to all
parties.
The court, after considering the report in the light of the evidence, may,
on motion of either party, take one of three courses of action. It may enter
an order confirming the appraiser's report, or modifying it, or rejecting the
determination.
If the report is confirmed, or modified, the court will direct the time
within which payment shall be made by the corporation and enter judgment
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accordingly. If the appraiser's determination is rejected, the court may
either determine the value by itself and enter judgment accordingly, or
remit the proceeding to the appraiser with appropriate directions. It is not
clear, wherein the difference lies between the modification of the report and
the independent determination after rejecting the report, except possibly
in the extent to which the final determination deviated from the appraiser's
reasoning and result. Except in cases where the court finds the stock-
holder's demand for appraisal arbitrary and vexatious, interest will be in-
cluded in the judgment beginning from the date of the stockholders' vote,
the majorities' written consent, or the filing of the certificate of ownership
upon merger, as the case may be (Section 21 (4) and (9), New York Stock
Corporation Law).
Costs and expenses shall be assessed against the corporation, except
where the court finds it equitable to apportion them in the light of circum-
stances. Counsel fees will never be assessed; expert fees only to the stock-
holder, if no offer was made by the corporation, or if the determined value
exceeds the offer materially (Section 21 (5), New York Stock Corporation
Law). The impossibility of recovering counsel fees in the appraisal pro-
cedure, even in the most blatant case of violation of minority rights, con-
stitutes a severe restriction. What was probably meant as a deterrent
against unnecessary litigation inspired by attorneys, is liable to jeopardize,
or at lease to affect seriously, the minority's position. Once the stock-
holder's demand is made, it may not be withdrawn without the corporation's
consent. All stockholders' rights have ceased, except the right to receive
payment. The stockholder's rights as a shareholder will, however, be retro-
actively revived if the demand is withdrawn with the corporation's con-
sent; no petition for the appointment of an appraiser is made after the
corporation fails to make an offer within ten days after the last day for a
stockholder's demand, or within 20 days after the mailing or delivery of
an unaccepted demand; the stockholder is found by court decision not to
be entitled to have his stock purchased, and, the action which prompted
the demand is abandoned or rescinded.
It may be noted, that the mere failure to consummate the action is not




As long as the stockholder's shares are purchased by agreement to the
corporation's offer, there is no lower limit to the price paid, except the
stockholder's willingness to accept and no upper limit, except the rules set
up in Section 21 (2) New York Stock Corporation Law for the maintenance
of capital. However, to determine the price, the problem becomes one of
"value." The word "value," in the sense of "value in exchange" (as distin-
guished from "value in use," which does not enter in this discussion) has
been defined33 as "the estimated or appraised worth of any object of property
82 Ibid.
33 Black's LAW DIcTIONARY, 1721 (4th ed., St. Paul, 1951).
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calculated in money." This definition helps, inasmuch as it introduces
money as a measure, but otherwise simply substitutes one undefined term
for another. The trouble with the definition of the word is, of course, as
so often stated, that it has many meanings dependent on its use in the par-
ticular context. Kester, in his book on Advanced Accounting84 says:
"Valuation and therefore, value, are relative terms and the value of a thing
varies according to the use for which it is desired. It thus frequently hap-
pens that the same thing may have several different values at the same
time." The United States Supreme Court 35 referred to value as, "at best
a guess by informed persons." Accountants distinguish, therefore, between
going concern value, liquidation value, market value, sales value, cost value,
and a number of related expressions such as development value, reproduction
value, depreciated value, etc., not all of which are really terms of valuation.
The terms "sound value," "fair value," "intrinsic value," "actual
value," "reasonable value" and similar terms, 30 often found in court lan-
guage, are frowned upon by accountants, because they suggest an antithesis
to non-existent terms; terms like "unsound," "unfair" etc. value would
constitute a contradictio in adjecto. Courts have sometimes said that all
these terms are synonymous, 37 which is correct only to the extent that they
all probably are supposed to mean a value correctly determined under the
given circumstances. In order to determine which of the many kinds of
"value" are meant by the appraisal statute of the Stock Corporation Law,
we must consider the history of the statute. It is obviously the dual aim
of the legislator to make it possible for a majority to accomplish its pur-
pose without being hampered by the dissenting minority, and at the same
time to protect the minority against being disfranchised, or otherwise harmed,
by the wish of the majority.
The appraisal procedure, which helps to divorce the minority from the
majority, wants to leave the former with a sum of money sufficient to com-
pensate it for its former legal position. It is obvious under the circum-
stances, that the value to be determined must disregard and discount the
results of the majority action, because to give effect to the results of such
action would indirectly give to the majorities' action the effect on the
minorities' stock which the statute tries to avoid. E.g. if a merger with an
ailing corporation would water down a corporation's stock, the decrease in
market quotations resulting therefrom cannot be taken into consideration.
There is no doubt that market value is an important factor in deter-
mining the value of stock, but it cannot be a final measure. Not only is
the market sometimes affected by the majority action, which, as we have
34 (3d Rev. ed., New York, 1933).
35 United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 63 S. Ct. 276, 87 L. Ed. 336 (1943).
36 These terms commonly strain for an expression of rectitude as a desirable goal
as in Matter of Dupignac, 123 Misc. 21, 204 N. Y. Supp. 273 (1924) the term "clear
market value" was first introduced. However, this term does nothing to clarify the
meaning of the statute.
37 Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 25 L. Ed. 903 (1879).
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seen, must be disregarded; the market also reacts frequently to rumors, hopes
and fears, which the appraisers may find unjustified; experts on stock market
problems know that price and value are not identical. Closed investment
trusts, in which the value of net assets can be determined to a fraction of a
cent, do not always sell at the proportionate price, as open-end trusts
must by regulations. 38  Arnold Bernhard, one of the outstanding authorities
on stock market values, has pointed out 39 that the relations of profits to price
are not the same for all industries, and that a standard of correlative values
may develop, which puts different expectations on certain stocks or entire
industries, the fulfillment of which may affect their market price without
being determinative of their value.
The market prices of stocks with a narrow trading range are easily
affected by circumstances which have nothing to do with value. They are
particularly susceptible to fluctuations caused by the quantity of stock
offered, while value under the appraisal statute should disregard the pos-
sible influence of the "unloading," which may be one of the results of the
majority action. In the case of untraded stocks, market value is not a
criterion in any case.
The classical definition, which holds the value of common stock to be
equal to the sum of all dividends it will pay in the future discounted to
the prevailing interest rate, is without avail, not only because the future
dividends are unknown, but also because the formula completely neglects
the net asset value of the business.
Under special circumstances, particularly in corporations with cumula-
tive voting rules, and in close corporations, a minority may have extraneous
advantages such as employment, agency, or suppliers' contracts, which a
merger or other change might jeopardize. In such cases the stock has a
value, which could never be reflected on its own balance sheet.40 But also
values which are, or could be shown on a balance sheet cause problems of
major proportions. The most frequent one is that of good will, which could
be reflection of the past history, or the future growth factors of the corpora-
tion.41  In this category belong also the "silent reserves," a sometimes
euphemistic term for the entire or partial omission or understatement of
assets, or the overstatement of liabilities.
In the evaluation of common stock under preferred, the "leverage
38 E.g., Lehman Bros. Corp. has sold at a premium for many years, while Tri-
Continental Corp. has been selling at a discount. For an interesting discussion of the
discount problem, see Tn-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Ch. 523, 65 A. 2d 910
(1950), 74 A. 2d 71, 76 (1950). See also, Note 42 infra.
39 IV THE VAUE IME DWVSTMMNT SuRvWY, No. 23 (New York, 1954).
40 The fallaciousness of book value as a yardstick is pointed out in Borg v. Inter-
national Silver Co., 11 F. 2d 147 (2d Cir. 1925).
41 Efforts to find a simple formula for good will were made by the courts in
Matter of Seaich, 170 App. Div. 686, 156 N. Y. Supp. 579 (1st Dept. 1915) and von
Au v. Magenheimer, 126 App. Div. 257, 110 N. Y. Supp. 629 (2d Dept. 1908), aff'd
196 N. Y. 510, 89 N. E. 1114 (1909).
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factor," i.e., the changing proportion of entitlement of common stock to
dividends, must be considered. E.g. if $500,000 preferred stock entitled
to 5% dividend are outstanding an increase of profits from $30,000 to
$40,QOO increases the profit available to the common stock not by 33.3%,
but by 200%.
Warrants and outstanding rights may have considerable influence on
stock values.42  Thus, we have seen that no general yardstick can be found
to guide the court or the appraiser.
The subjective interests of majority and minority both have to be
weighed together with all objective factors of net worth, and all available
components of past history and future expectations, in order to determine
the price at which it may be deemed equitable to impose on the corpora-
tion the burden of a purchase, and to expect from the minority to part with
their stock. The courts have tried, at times, to find an exhaustive formula
for the determination,43 but their efforts prove only that complex problems
can be simplified only at the expense of correctness. Sometimes courts, im-
patient with the kaleidoscopic facets of the problem, have tried to limit
the scope of appraisal by pointing out that "appraisal proceedings should
4 4
be kept within reasonable bounds," and suggesting short cuts. The dicta
contained in these decisions may fit the particular case, but cannot be gen-
eralized without Procrustean consequences to the just administration of the
law. Although the statute is silent on the point, it would seem that a stock
which is actively traded, could as a rule, not be appraised lower than the
last bid quotation before the majority action, because the minority could
have sold at that price, if the majority action had not intervened. 4"
V
Once it is recognized that the the appraisal procedure is the codifica-
tion of a compromise, the question, whether the demand to purchase is an
exclusive remedy, is redundant. Compromise implicitly means a mutual
retreat from extreme postulates to obviate conflict. The legislator would
not, and probably for constitutional reasons could not, abrogate uncontro-
vertible rights of minority stockholders to set aside overreaching actions of
the majority to the minorities' detriment.
While the minority stockholder always has the right to avail himself
of the appraisal statute, he cannot be confined to it.4 0 Stockholders, there-
42 In Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Ch. 523, 74 A. 2d 71 (1950) revers-
ing 66 A. 2d 910, the Court had to deal with a stock which combined the problems
of leverage, warrants and discount.
43 See Matter of Fulton, 257 N. Y. 487, 178 N. E. 766 (1931).
44 See in re Marcus, 273 App. Div. 725, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 76 (1st Dept. 1948).
45 In re Karlin, 202 Misc. 792, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 96 (1951), the court pointed out
that the appraisers' problem is not to determine the net worth, but the value of the
stock.
46 Stevens, HANDBoox ON THE LAW or CORPORATioNs, C. 14, § 123, p. 496 (Horn-
book Series, St. Paul, 1936), citing Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47,
156 A. 183 (1931).
[VOL., I
COMMENTS
fore, were found to be entitled to actions against officers guilty of waste,47
injunctive relief 48 and the remedies which equity might afford. However,
where it is not a question of infringing on minority rights, but merely a
question of dissent as to the direction of a corporate decision, the appraisal
takes the place of any other equitable relief to the extent that the dicta of
these decisions indicate that the appraisal statutes are exclusive; their
validity is questionable.
The argument used by the Court of Appeals in the Beloff case, that
the right of the Legislature to amend corporate charters (N. Y. CONST.,
art. x, § 1) implicitly permits the abrogation of stockholders' rights, is tenu-
ous to say the least. Due to the unrestricted language found in some deci-
sions, it was for a long time unclear as to whether or not New York Courts
followed the minority rule of exclusiveness of remedy. In a stockholder suit
against negligent directors, 49 the Appellate Division permitted the alterna-
tive remedy; in two more recent cases 50 concerning consolidations and merg-
ers, the Court of Appeals used language which seems to indicate that the
appraisal statute was considered lex specialis. In a recent case,51 how-
ever, the Court of Appeals clarified its stand, by saying that the remedy
of appraisal is exclusive only where the rights of the minority are adequately
protected by the purchase of their share; the appraisal statute may not be
used to "force out" the minority; conversely mere "strike suits" cannot
count on the aid of equity, and the best a malevolent dissenter can expect,
is to be bought out.
52
In connection with the question of exclusiveness, the problem arose,
whether apart from the statute discussed above, an equitable right could
be established to demand the purchase of a minority interest.53 The possi-
bility of an interpretative extension of a statutory remedy has been ques-
tioned.54 Actually, there should be no question that a statutory remedy
cannot be extended, 55 nor should there be any doubt that under given cir-
cumstances, not enumerated in the law, a court of equity could find that the
buying out of the minority might be the equitable solution of a bona fide
controversy. The converse question, whether corporations could insert in
their charter a clause prohibiting the use of the statutory remedy, has not
been answered unequivocally. In England the remedy is mandatory, 56 and
47 Bown v. Ramsdell, 227 App. Div. 224, 237 N. Y. Supp. 573 (4th Dept. 1929).
48 Starret Corp. v. Fifth Ave. Corp., 1 F. Supp. 868 (D. C., S. D., N. Y., 1932).
49 Brown v. Ramsde]l, op cit. supra note 47.
50 Anderson v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 295 N. Y. 343, 67 N. E.
2d 573 (1946); Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., 300 N. Y. 11, 87 N. E.
2d 561 (1949).
51 Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 306 N. Y. 58, 115 N. E. 2d 652
(1953).
52 Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc. 98, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 52 (1952).
53 Garzo v. Maid of Mist Steamboat Co., 303 N. Y. 516, 104 N. E. 2d 882 (1952).
54 Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 15 Cornell
L. Q. 420, 425 (1930); Ballantine, CoRpoRAroNs 683, § 290 (Rev. ed., Chicago, 1946).
55 Marcus v. R. H. Macy & Co., 297 N. Y. 38, 72 N. E. 2d 228 (1947).
56 Payne v. The Cork Co., [1900] 1 Ch. 308.
94 NEW YORK LAW FORUM [VOL. 1
the writers on the subject seem to agree, that a protection introduced by
statute cannot be eliminated by the same group against whose action it was
designed to protect the minority.57 There is indication that the New York
courts will follow this line of reasoning.
58
As corporations gain in importance and size, the problems of mutual
protection of minority and majority powers will continue to gain in im-
portance. It is likely that, as time goes on, the appraisal statutes will not
only be clarified by court decisions, but also further extended by legislature.
An understanding of the controversial issues, and of the overlapping of legal
and accounting problems in this field, will do much for the improvement of
business relations among corporate stockholders.
57 Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment, 1 Cornell
L. Q. 420, 430 (1930).
58 People ex rel. Barney v. Whalen, 189 N. Y. 560, 82 N. E. 1131 (1907) states
that the statute could not be abrogated by a change of the voting majority required.
